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ABSTRACT 
 
ERIN COOLEY: Groups as Justification for Blatant Race Stereotyping 
(Under the direction of B. Keith Payne) 
 
 Research has shown that groups are perceived as more aggressive and less 
trustworthy than individuals and Blacks are perceived as more aggressive than Whites. In 
two studies, I examined how these biases interact, leading to especially negative perceptions 
of Black groups. In Study 1, subjects made ratings of the aggressiveness and trustworthiness 
of Black groups, White groups, Black individuals and White individuals. On measures of 
both implicit and explicit attitudes, participants displayed a tendency to judge Black groups 
as more aggressive and less trustworthy than Black individuals; this tendency was greater 
than a similar tendency to judge White groups as more aggressive and less trustworthy than 
White individuals. While I expected racial bias on a measure of implicit attitudes, I was 
surprised to see strong levels of racial bias on a measure of explicit attitudes in a college 
population that tends to be liberally biased. In Study 2, I simplified my design to look only at 
explicit ratings of Black and White groups. I also included hypothesized moderators 
including a validated measure of general expectations about groups. Results indicated that 
Black groups were rated as more aggressive and less trustworthy than White groups. Further, 
this racial bias was most likely among those who also had negative expectations about groups 
in general. Consistent with the justification-suppression theory of prejudice, I conclude that 
participants use their negative expectations about groups as a justification for expressing 
prejudice toward Black groups on an explicit measure.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine you have just arrived for your first night-shift at a local convenience store. 
As you are organizing shelves, an hour or so into your shift, you notice a Black individual 
lingering outside the storefront. Not wanting any action on your part to be taken as race-
related, you busy yourself with organizing the products you are placing on the shelves. A 
couple of minutes later you glance at the door and see that this individual has been joined by 
two other Black individuals. At this point, do you feel any more justified to take actions --
asking them to leave, notifying your supervisor, calling the police? Would your feeling of 
threat be any stronger than that you would have felt for a White individual who was then 
joined by two other White individuals? The present research suggests that the answers may 
be “yes” and “yes.” 
Centrality of Groups 
Humans are a group-dwelling species (Coon, 1946); undoubtedly this aspect of 
humanity has both practical and psychological implications for human survival and 
experience. Practically, groups increase the chance of survival and reproduction through 
providing childcare, protection, and additional forces for attaining food, water, and shelter 
(Kameda & Tindale, 2006; Macdonald, 1983).  In modern times, research in organizational 
behavior supports that working together, in many instances, leads to better outcomes than 
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working as individuals (Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Hill, 1982; Gruenfeld & Hollingshead, 
1993; Kraut, 2002). 
Beyond the utility of groups, the psychological function of human groups is much 
more complicated. Reflecting the centrality of group membership to the self, Tajfel (1981) 
proposed that human identity can be divided into two dimensions: individual identity and 
social identity. This novel proposal of a “social” identity refers to the portion of our identity 
that is intertwined with our group membership. Supporting the importance of group 
membership to the self, Leary and Baumeister (2005) reviewed evidence that the experience 
of “belonging” reduces both physical, as well as, psychological impairments. In particular, 
these authors present various literatures signifying the relation between steady emotional 
contact with others and the decreased occurrence of anxiety and experienced stress, as well 
as, cancers and a variety of other illnesses. In fact, loneliness appears to be extremely 
detrimental to our health with repercussions including increased cortisol levels, physical 
illness, and even mental illness (see Leary & Baumeister, 2005, for review). Given the 
evidence that groups are integral to our human experience, it becomes important to 
understand not just how individuals interact with one another, but also the distinct social 
dynamics of groups of individuals acting together. 
CHAPTER 2 
INTERGROUP INTERACTION 
 
Salient instances of extreme violence between groups are not scarce: the Natzis 
toward the Jewish people, the KKK toward African Americans, Palestinians and Israelis, pro-
Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi groups in Libya; the list goes on and on. With these instances in 
mind, it is easy to envision instances of extreme intergroup conflict between well-established 
and cohesive groups who represent a particular religion, race, or belief system. Likewise, the 
level of anger and hostility that one may expect from such groups seems to supersede that 
expressed by individuals acting independently from their group membership.  
           While these real-world rivals are important to explore in their own right, more 
startling evidence comes from the findings on interactions between minimal groups (see 
Pinter & Greenwald, 2011 for a review). In these studies, individuals are grouped together 
based on arbitrary details such as whether they tend to overestimate or underestimate when 
guessing the number of dots that appear on a screen (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). 
Although such group memberships are unrelated to the deep-seated ideological groups that 
we commonly imagine in contentious intergroup interactions, evidence of intergroup conflict 
still emerges. In fact, even these “minimal groups” show a rapid production of ingroup 
favoritism, frequently accompanied by outgroup aversion and even outgroup hate and 
hostility. 
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In the well-known Robber’s Cave studies, Sherif et al. (1961) show clearly how even 
groups formed arbitrarily, can quickly develop a strong dislike of other similar groups 
leading to diverse forms of outgroup hostility. Specifically, Sherif et al. (1961) brought 24 
boys, 12 years of age, to an isolated campsite where they were divided randomly into two 
groups; after a short time of separation, these two groups interacted in competitions designed 
to invoke mutual frustration. Quickly, outgroup hostility rose to an impressive level: each 
group engaged in outgroup stereotypes, outgroup ridicule, intergroup avoidance, and even 
intergroup violence. This finding of extreme intergroup behavior, based on groups that are 
formed arbitrarily, has been replicated numerous times in controlled laboratory settings 
(Tajfel et al., 1971; Diehl, 1988; Ostrom, 1992). These findings imply that there is an 
inherent aspect of group membership, separate from shared group beliefs or ideologies, 
which cause humans to behave distinctly when interacting as a group. 
More recently, laboratory research has directly examined interactions between 
individuals as they compare to interactions between even minimal groups. This research has 
consistently found that interactions between groups (again, even minimal groups) operate 
distinctly from interactions between individuals: specifically, the behavior of groups is more 
competitive and marked by less trust than the behavior of individuals. This phenomenon, 
termed the interindividual intergroup discontinuity effect has been widely researched 
(McCallum et al., 1985; Insko et al. 1987, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1998, 2005; Cohen, 
Wildschut, & Insko 2010; Gaertner & Insko, 2000, 2001; Schopler et al., 1993, 1999; 
Wildschut, Insko, Gaertner, 2002; Wildschut et al., 2003).  
In the original studies by Insko et al. (1987), two individuals or two groups interacted 
with one another in a game of money payoffs, specifically a prisoner’s dilemma game 
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(PDG). In a PDG, interaction partners can either choose to cooperate or can choose to 
compete. If both sides cooperate, both receive equal and moderately beneficial outcomes 
(average amounts of money). Competing leads to a less clear outcome. If one side of the 
interaction chooses to compete and the other side cooperates, then the competing team 
benefits by gaining extra money. If both teams compete, both receive inferior outcomes 
(lowest amount of money). A matrix, similar to those used in the studies on the 
interindividual intergroup discontinuity effect can be seen in Appendix A. 
 In comparing intergroup interactions with interindividual interactions in the PDG, 
groups are much more likely to compete. Further research has shown that this interindividual 
intergroup discontinuity is partially mediated by trust: groups tend to feel less trust of their 
interaction partner and this lack of trust is related to increased tendency to compete (Cohen et 
al., 2010). This finding suggests a pernicious cycle of expectations (“The other group will not 
be trustworthy”) and behavioral confirmation (“I need to compete to preempt their non-
cooperative nature”). 
The interindividual intergroup discontinuity has been replicated outside of the lab 
setting, as well as with competitive and cooperative interactions aside from the PDG matrix 
(Pemberton, Insko, & Schopler, 1995; Schopler et al., 2001; Wolf et al., 2008). The 
interindividual intergroup discontinuity effect has also proven to be cross-culturally robust: 
in fact, the tendency for groups to behave more competitively than individuals is similar 
across individualistic and collectivistic cultures (Wildschut et al., 2001; Takemura & Yuki, 
2002; Derlega et al. 2002)  
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Furthering the implications of the interindividual intergroup discontinuity, Meier and 
Hinsz (2003) have found that not only competition, but also aggression is enhanced when a 
group is the receiver or the giver of the potentially aggressive response. Specifically, these 
researchers found that when groups and individuals are given the task of deciding how much 
hot sauce another group or individual must ingest, groups are more likely to choose painful 
outcomes for others (i.e. large amounts of hot sauce) (Meier & Hinsz, 2003). Interestingly, 
they also found increased aggression with interactions between an individual and a group: 
apparently a group does not need to be interacting with another group to see evidence of 
increased aggression. 
CHAPTER 3 
EXISTING STEREOTYPES OF GROUPS AND BLACKS 
 
Perception of Groups 
Given these behavioral differences of even minimal groups, it would make sense that 
people would hold different expectations for the behavior of groups as compared to the 
behavior of individuals. Hoyle, Pinkley, and Insko (1989) found just this: participants asked 
to consider adjectives they believed would apply to interindividual interactions as compared 
to intergroup interactions, attributed adjectives related to “abrasiveness” to group interactions 
and adjectives related to “agreeableness” to interindividual interactions. Given the negativity 
of both expectations and outcomes involving groups, in the present analyses, I examine how 
perceptions of groups interact with established race-related stereotypes in an interaction 
involving a Black group. Are Blacks viewed as a group especially vulnerable to these 
negative group-based judgments? 
Stereotypes of Blacks 
Many stereotypes associated with Black individuals are negative in valence: 
unintelligent, hostile, poor, lazy and dishonest (Devine, 1989; Devine and Eliot, 1995). 
Broadly, stereotypes can be defined as cognitive representations of culturally held beliefs 
about individuals based on their group membership (Jost & Hamilton, 2005). Although 
stereotypes free cognitive energy by simplifying perception of others, these cognitive 
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shortcuts will inevitably lead to the mischaracterization of some group members. Because of 
this, stereotyping can lead to not only undesirable, but also inaccurate perceptions of others 
based on superficial characteristics (Allport, 1954; Tajfel, 1981).  
On the surface, America has made substantial progress in the past 50 years in fighting 
race-related stereotyping and discrimination (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). 
Fewer people are willing to directly express stereotype-based beliefs, and those that do 
openly express race-related prejudice are more likely to be chastised. As an example, the 
recent comments of Senate majority leader Harry Reid elicited public outrage. In 
conjecturing why Obama had found success with the American public, Reid stated it was due 
to Obama’s “light skinned appearance” and speaking patterns “with no Negro dialect unless 
he wanted to have one.” Reid was compelled to apologize due to the public outcry which 
followed his remarks (Preston, 2010). In relation to this, the fact that Obama has been elected 
our first Black President, provides a more salient indicator of increased racial tolerance, and 
may, in and of itself, have positive repercussions for perceptions of Blacks (Plant et al., 
2009). Unfortunately, the salience of America’s election of Obama may camouflage both 
more subtle present-day racism, as well as, the continuation of blatant bigotry.  
In fact, there are a variety of factors that undermine the positivity of the apparent 
changes in race- related interactions.  For one, the majority of social psychological 
experiments are run on college sophomores. Because this population tends to be far more 
liberal than the more general population, levels of direct prejudice may be underestimated 
(Henry, 2008). In more representative populations, the expression of prejudice toward Blacks 
has by no means disappeared. A recent national elections survey reflected that individual 
differences in explicit prejudice were strong predictors of voting for Obama across a variety 
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of measures of explicit prejudice: feelings of warmth, empathy, and admiration for Blacks, as 
well as, a battery of items measuring Symbolic Racism (Payne, Krosnick, Pasek, Lelkes, 
Akhtar, & Tompson, 2010). Therefore, despite the apparent increase in interracial tolerance, 
emblems of prejudice toward Blacks persist. 
 CHAPTER 4 
MEASURING ATTITUDES TOWARD BLACKS 
 
In response to the apparent complexity of modern day prejudice expression, measures 
of racial bias have become more sophisticated; specifically, measures of direct, or explicit, 
attitudes have become less direct, while a new class of measures which capture indirect, 
implicit attitudes and stereotyping have gained momentum. In regard to adapted explicit 
measures, two scales are commonly used: the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) and 
the Symbolic Racism Scale (Kinder & Sears, 1981). Each of these scales addresses an 
explicit prejudice that is distinct from blatant old- fashioned racism; while old-fashioned 
racism is marked by openly negative affect toward Blacks, Modern Racism and Symbolic 
Racism capture a more discrete, although still explicit, level of bias. In particular, Modern 
Racism contends that the affective and cognitive aspects of prejudice are distinct. Under this 
form of racism, it is thought that the affective, emotion-laden portion of prejudice is learned 
early in life and therefore, difficult to overcome—even despite later cognitive disagreement 
with prejudice (McConahay, Hardee, Batts, 1981; McConahay, 1986). Symbolic Racism, 
used in the present study, measures underlying prejudice toward Blacks based on the 
endorsement of beliefs that Blacks violate traditional values. These beliefs are strongly 
driven by a value of individualism, or the obligation of an individual to manage and 
overcome his or her own struggles. Given this, Symbolic Racism tends to predict political 
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conservatism, as well as the rejection of pro-black policies such as affirmative action (Sears 
1988; Sears & Henry, 2003).  
In comparison, measures of implicit attitudes avoid direct reports of attitudes 
completely by tapping into quick, automatic associations. The early literature on implicit 
attitudes argued that there were four necessary components necessary to make an attitude 
implicit.  Bargh (1994) described these as the “four horseman” of automaticity: lack of 
awareness, independence of cognitive resources, lack of controllability, and lack of intention.  
However, current theory proposes that not all four of these elements must occur for a 
measure to be described as implicit (see De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, & Spruyt, 2009, for 
review). In fact, we have unpublished data showing that participants are aware of the bias 
that they report on an implicit measure, and that how they think about this expression of bias, 
specifically how much they own these implicit attitudes, dictates how they report their biases 
on a subsequent direct measure (Payne, Cooley, & Lei, 2010). Therefore, the aspects of 
implicit measures focused on in the present analysis are the latter two components: lack of 
controllability and independence from the goals and intentions of the respondent.   
There are currently myriad measures that can be used to measure implicit race 
attitudes. These measures include, but are not limited to: the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), the Go/No Go Association Test (GNAT; Nosek & 
Banaji 2001), the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), 
as well as, a variety of other sequential priming tasks (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 
1995; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997)  Of these, the IAT published by Greenwald and 
colleagues (1998), is one of the most widely used implicit measures. The AMP, used in the 
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present study, is also gaining popularity as a reliable and valid measure of implicit attitudes 
which provides large effect sizes. 
Although a degree of debate continues as to whether implicit and explicit attitudes 
represent one underlying attitude or two separate attitudes, many agree that implicit and 
explicit attitudes may result from separate processing systems (Posner & Snyder, 1975; 
Shiffrin & Snyder, 1977; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
In fact, Payne and Stewart (2007), in their process disassociation approach, mathematically 
separate those portions of our judgments that are automatic (implicit) from those portions 
that result from controlled (explicit) responding. 
Because measures of implicit and explicit attitudes sometimes converge, sometimes 
diverge, and sometimes overlap only slightly, it is helpful to measure both implicit and 
explicit attitudes to better capture the mechanisms and processes underlying individuals’ 
prejudices. Given this varying relation between implicit and explicit attitudes, theorists have 
developed a variety of theories to predict when the two will be related and when they will 
not. Cunninham, Preacher, & Banaji (2001) have found that using latent variables can greatly 
reduce the measurement error of implicit measures, which therefore increases implicit-
explicit correspondence. Processing capacity, and whether one is assessing personal or 
extrapersonal associations has also proven useful for understanding implicit-explicit 
correspondence (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Fazio, 1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007; Payne, Cooley, & Lei, 2010).  Finally, structural fit, or 
matching the procedural components of implicit and explicit measures, improves implicit-
explicit correspondence (Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008).  
 CHAPTER 5  
THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
 
 
In the present series of studies, I measure both direct, explicit race bias, as well as 
automatic, implicit bias to examine my expectation of increased stereotyping of Blacks 
viewed as a group. To boost correspondence between these two types of measures, I 
increased structural fit by using the same images of Blacks and Whites for both implicit and 
explicit judgments (see Appendix A). Evidence shows that this process can increase implicit-
explicit correspondence. 
To measure implicit bias I used the AMP. The AMP’s approach to measuring implicit 
attitudes is to take advantage of the ambiguity associated with the origin of an attitude by 
measuring to what extent people misattribute attitudes toward photos (such as Black or White 
individuals or groups) onto subsequent ambiguous objects (such as Chinese pictographs). 
Participants are asked to ignore the photos which flash before the Chinese pictograph and to 
judge whether they believe the pictograph is pleasant or unpleasant. The AMP is also flexible 
in that the response dimensions (pleasant or unpleasant) can be catered to the task at hand (in 
the present analyses: aggressive or non- aggressive and trustworthy or non-trustworthy). 
 In Study 1, I tested my primary prediction regarding stereotyping of Blacks viewed 
as a group. Specifically, I measured explicit and implicit stereotyping of photos of White and 
Black individuals and White and Black groups on the dimensions of aggression and trust. I 
hypothesized that Blacks viewed as a group would be particularly likely to be judged as 
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aggressive and non-trustworthy. In Study 2, I explored the mechanism behind the enhanced 
tendency to stereotype Blacks viewed as a group. Specifically, I measured endorsement of 
adjectives used to describe interactions between groups as compared to endorsement of 
adjectives used to describe interactions between individuals. I predicted that those who 
expected intergroup interactions to be particularly abrasive in general would subsequently 
feel more justified in expressing bias on an explicit measure (the same used in Study 1) when 
rating Black groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
STUDY 1 
 
My goal in the first study was to determine if people are more likely to use 
stereotypes about Blacks when these Blacks are encountered as a group as opposed to when 
they are encountered as individuals.  I focused on two specific dimensions of racial 
stereotypes: aggression and trustworthiness.  Aggression is relevant to both judgments of 
groups as well as judgments of Blacks: an identical behavior is perceived as more 
competitive when executed by a group as compared to when it is executed by an individual, 
and aggression is a common stereotype of Blacks (Devine & Eliot, 1995; Insko et al. 1987, 
1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1998, 2005). Trust is relevant to judgments of groups as well: 
research has shown a tendency to view groups, and especially those to which we do not 
belong (outgroups), with distrust (Campbell & Levine, 1961; Cohen et al., 2010). Therefore, 
I expected White participants, for whom Blacks are a relevant racial outgroup, to judge Black 
groups as more aggressive and less trustworthy than Black individuals.  I expected this 
difference to be much greater than a similar tendency to rate White groups as more 
aggressive and less trustworthy than White individuals. I measured each participant’s 
attitudes as reported on both implicit and explicit measures in a counterbalanced design.  
Method 
Participants 
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Participants were 111 undergraduates (86% White; 9% African American or Black; 
8% Asian; 3% Hispanic; 3% Native American or Pacific Islander; 2% Other) at the 
University of North Carolina- Chapel hill participating for partial course credit. Up to four 
participants signed up for 60-minute sessions through an internet website for human research 
participation. Eight participants who reported being able to speak, read, or understand 
Chinese were eliminated due the difficultly of interpreting their implicit biases: because the 
AMP uses Chinese symbols as neutral stimuli, being able to read these symbols interferes 
with their neutrality. Additionally, because I was interested in attitudes toward Blacks, to 
simplify my interpretations I only analyzed the data of those who self-reported as White. All 
analyses were run on the remaining 85 participants (22 males; 63 females).  
Procedure 
Upon arriving to the experiment, participants were seated at a computer in individual 
cubicles for privacy. After signing an informed consent, the experimenter read a brief 
explanation of the study to participants.  
Participants were told that they would be completing two unrelated tasks on the 
computer.  One task was described as a concentration task (implicit ratings). For the other 
task, participants were told they would be making judgments about groups and individuals 
based only on looking at their photos.  These two tasks were counterbalanced so that some 
participants completed the measure of explicit attitudes first and some participants completed 
the measure of implicit attitudes first. Participants concluded by completing two general 
measures of race attitudes. 
Explicit evaluations 
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For the explicit measure of stereotyping, participants saw photo primes of Black 
groups, Black individuals, White groups and White individuals in a 2 (group context: group 
or individual) x 2 (race: Black or White)  within-subjects design. A total of 12 Black 
individual photos and 12 White individual photos were used; group photos were created by 
using Adobe Photoshop to put three of the same race individuals into one photo. The 
background and size of the pictures were standardized across primes; specifically, the 
background was the hallway of the UNC-Chapel Hill psychology building which supported 
the explanation that these were prior participants in our experiments.   
Each participant was exposed to 6 White individual photos and 6 Black individual 
photos. The group photos they saw consisted of two White groups of three and 2 Black 
groups of 3; these groups consisted of the individuals from the photos that participants had 
not yet been exposed to. This assured that no participant saw a particular individual presented 
as both an individual, as well as, part of a group. All photos showed only the neck and face of 
the models, with neutral facial expressions. These photos were previously pilot tested so that 
Black and White photos were matched on attractiveness and were selected to be highly 
prototypical of their respective racial category. 
Before seeing the photos, participants were told that, even with small amounts of 
information, people’s judgments about others can be quite accurate. Therefore, they were 
told they would view photos of participants who came into lab last semester to interact in an 
experimental game. Participants were told that in one version of the prior study, we had 
individuals sign up so that we would have individuals interacting with other individuals. In 
another version, the experimenter explained that we had participants sign up in groups of 
three so that we could have groups interacting with other groups. The interaction was 
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described as an experimental game that involved opportunities for gaining points by using 
either cooperative or competitive strategies. This information was verbally stated by the 
experimenter before the study began; additionally, this information appeared in instructions 
given by the computer program directly before the explicit judgment portion. 
Participants then saw 6 individual Black photos, 6 individual White photos, 2 White 
group photos and 2 Black group photos created as explained previously. Each photo was 
shown two times in random order so that participants could answer both how aggressive they 
found the individual or group in each photo to be, as well as, how trustworthy they found the 
individual or group to be. These judgments were made on 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) 
response scales. Because participants were directly reporting their judgments, there was not a 
need to ask them to make the same judgment multiple times as is common in implicit tasks. 
Implicit evaluations (AMP) 
To measure implicit attitudes, I used the AMP.  The primes were the photos of Black 
groups, Black individuals, White groups and White individuals used in the explicit task. 
Contrary to the explicit task, though, participants were asked to ignore the influence of these 
photos on their judgments.  Previous research has shown that it takes as little as 100 ms for 
the eye to make a full saccade, or left to right motion (Fischer & Weber, 1993). Because it 
was important that participants had time to see all three group members in the group photo 
primes, all primes appeared in the center of the screen for a conservative 200 ms. The 
Chinese pictograph subsequently appeared for 125 ms. A blank gray square followed and 
remained on the screen until participants made their judgments. Specifically, participants 
were instructed to choose if the Chinese symbol’s meaning was more in line with one of two 
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English concepts. In one block of trials these judgments involved pressing “Q” for “non 
trustworthy” or “P” for “trustworthy.” In a second block of trials, these judgments involved 
pressing “Q” for “non aggressive” or “P” for “aggressive.” In each of the two blocks, there 
were 80 randomly ordered trials: 20 trials with Black group photo primes, 20 trials with 
Black individual photo primes, 20 trials with White group photo primes, and 20 trials with 
White individual photo primes. All primes were randomly paired with one of 80 unique 
Chinese pictographs. 
Participants were told this task was a concentration task. They were advised to ignore 
the photo prime and focus on the Chinese symbol.  This warning served to make certain that 
any influences of the photo primes occurred even though participants were instructed to 
ignore their influence; this increases confidence that differences are indications of automatic 
influences of attitudes elicited by the photo primes. Participants made judgments about 
whether the Chinese symbol’s meaning was more in line with the English concept of 
“trustworthy” or “non trustworthy” in one block. In the other block, participants made a 
similar judgment using “aggressive” or “non aggressive” response options. 
Self-report attitude measures 
Two self-report measures of racial attitudes completed the study: the Symbolic 
Racism scale (SRS; Henry & Sears, 2002) and the Internal and External Motivations to 
Control Prejudice scale (IMS/EMS; Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant & Devine, 1998). The SRS 
is a 10-item scale measuring a subtle form of present day racism: the degree to which 
individuals resist change to the current racial status quo. The scale measures agreement to 
items such as “Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and 
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worked their way up. Blacks should do the same.” The IMS/EMS is a 10 item assessment of 
how motivated participants are to control prejudice. Responses were made on a 1(strongly 
disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) scale. This scale is a combination of both internal motivation 
(IMS) and external motivation (EMS) subscales. The internal motivation subscale measures 
intrinsic motivation to control prejudice with items such as “I attempt to act in nonprejudiced 
ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me.” The external subscale 
measures extrinsic motivation to control prejudice with items such as “Because of today's PC 
(politically correct) standards I try to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people.” Previous 
research has found that these two subscales can have differential impacts on expressions of 
prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998).  
Results 
Scoring of DVs 
For explicit judgments of how aggressive photos appeared, I first took separate 
averages of responses to Black group photos, Black individual photos, White group photos 
and White individual photos.  I then converted these averages into proportions of the 
maximum possible score to allow comparisons with explicit evaluations in further analyses. 
Because ratings were on a 1 to 5 scale, I subtracted 1 from all scores to create minimum of 0 
and then divided this number by 4.  This process was repeated for explicit judgments of how 
trustworthy each photo appeared. 
For implicit judgments of aggressiveness, I looked at the block of 80 AMP trials (20 
per type of prime) measuring aggression. I then calculated the proportion of times 
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participants hit the response key which indicated “aggressive” for Black groups, Black 
individuals, White groups, and White individuals.  
Likewise, for implicit judgments of trustworthiness, I looked at the block of 80 AMP 
trials measuring trust. I then calculated the proportion of times participants hit the response 
key which indicated “trustworthy” for each type of prime.  
Impact of Groups on Race Bias  
Although I counterbalanced measures of implicit and explicit attitudes, I did not 
observe any effect of order for aggressiveness ratings. Therefore, the remaining analyses are 
collapsed across order condition. To examine my main hypothesis for aggressiveness 
judgments, I performed a 2 (Race: Black or White) x 2 (Group: Individual or Group) x 2 
(Type of Measure: Implicit or Explicit) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). I 
found support for my main hypothesis as can be seen in Figure 1. Black photos were rated as 
more aggressive than White photos, F(1, 84) = 48.23, p < .001, and groups were rated as 
more aggressive than individuals F(1, 84) = 23.77, p < .001. Importantly, these main effects 
were qualified by a significant Race x Group interaction, F(1, 84) = 16.74, p < .001. 
Specifically, Black groups were judged as significantly more aggressive than White groups, 
F(1, 84) = 59.57, p < .001; likewise, Black individuals were judged as significantly more 
aggressive than White individuals F(1,84) = 20.24, p < .001. Additionally, Black groups 
were judged as significantly more aggressive than Black individuals, F(1, 84) = 41.43, p < 
.001, while ratings of White groups did not differ from ratings of White individuals F(1, 84) 
= 2.86, p = .10. The three-way, Race x Group x Type of Measure interaction revealed no 
significant difference between the explicit and implicit measures, F(1, 84) = 1.64, p = .20. In 
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sum, Blacks were perceived as more aggressive than Whites, especially when in groups; this 
racial bias was evident on both explicit and implicit measures.  
As with aggressiveness ratings, I did not observe any effect of the order of measures 
of implicit and explicit attitudes for trustworthiness ratings. Therefore, the remaining 
analyses are collapsed across order condition. To examine my main hypothesis for 
trustworthiness judgments, I performed a second 2 (Race: Black or White) x 2 (Group: 
Individual or Group) x 2 (Type of Measure: Implicit or Explicit) repeated measures analysis 
of variance (ANOVA). Again, I found support for my main hypothesis as can be seen in 
Figure 2. Black photos were rated as less trustworthy than White photos, F(1, 84) = 18. 97, p 
< .001, and groups were rated as less trustworthy than individuals F(1, 84) = 8.76, p < .01. 
These main effects were qualified by a significant Race x Group interaction, F(1, 84) = 8.35, 
p < .01. Specifically, Black groups were judged as significantly less trustworthy than White 
groups, F(1, 84) = 26.89, p < .001; likewise, Black individuals were judged as significantly 
less trustworthy than White individuals F(1,84) = 5.83, p = .02. Additionally, Black groups 
were judged as significantly less trustworthy than Black individuals F(1, 84) = 13.75, p < 
.001, while ratings of White groups did not differ from ratings of White individuals F(1, 84) 
= .322, p = .57. As with aggression, the Race x Group x Type of Measure interaction 
revealed no significant differences based on type of measure, F(1, 84) = .576, p = .45. In 
sum, Blacks were perceived as less trustworthy than Whites, especially when in groups; as 
with aggression ratings, this racial bias was evident on both explicit and implicit measures.  
Discussion 
Past research has established that groups are perceived differently from individuals. 
In their work on universal stereotypes, Campbell & Levine (1961), proposed that cross-
23 
 
culturally, outgroups, or groups to which we do not belong, are perceived as “aggressive and 
expansionistic” and with sentiments such as “they will cheat us if they can” (Campbell & 
Levine, 1961; Levine, 1965).  More recently, the interindividual intergroup discontinuity 
effect has found that, in the context of a PDG, groups behave more competitively than 
individuals (Insko et al., 1987, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1998, 2001; Meier & Hinsz, 2004; 
Wolf, Insko, Kirchner, & Wildschut, 2008). A mediator of this increased competition 
between two groups, as compared to the level of competition between two individuals, is the 
tendency to view groups with more distrust (Cohen et al., 2010). Likewise, previous research 
has found similar race-based stereotypes of Blacks. Although, in modern times, people are 
less likely to endorse stereotypes of Blacks, a majority report knowledge of the common 
stereotypes of Blacks; one prominent stereotype involves viewing Blacks as aggressive 
(Devine, 1989; Devine & Eliot, 1995).  
Consistent with this literature, I predicted that race-related biases would interact with 
relevant outgroup biases, to create exacerbated stereotyping for Blacks viewed as a group. 
Specifically, I predicted that White subjects would view Blacks groups as particularly 
aggressive and non-trustworthy. I found support for my hypothesis through two main effects 
and an interaction: groups were judged as more aggressive and less trustworthy than 
individuals, Blacks were judged as more aggressive and less trustworthy than Whites, and the 
detrimental effect of seeing Blacks as a group was much stronger than the effect of seeing 
Whites as a group. In other words, Black groups were judged as more aggressive and less 
trustworthy than White groups, and this difference was significantly larger than a similar 
tendency to rate Black individuals as more aggressive and less trustworthy than White 
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individuals. Unfortunately, these findings seem to imply that multiple Blacks, viewed as a 
group, may be especially susceptible to stereotypical judgments. 
As stated earlier, because of increasingly strong norms that overtly endorsing race 
biases is not socially acceptable, I expected that participants would express less bias on an 
explicit measure than on an implicit measure such as the AMP. Contrary to this prediction, 
however, both the measure of implicit race attitudes as well as the measure of explicit race 
attitudes showed exacerbated stereotyping of Black groups. Although some evidence 
suggests that explicit stereotyping has not diminished as much as we may think, it is rare to 
see such extreme explicit reports of stereotyping among a liberally biased college population.  
There are a variety of suggestions why explicit and implicit measures would or would 
not be correlated. Some theories propose that implicit and explicit measures will show 
distinct results when motivations and opportunity to control prejudice are present (Fazio & 
Towles-Schwen, 1999). Motivations to control prejudice are predicted to have an impact on 
deliberate, explicit judgments, due to the fact that participants have time and capacity to take 
their motivations into account. Measures of implicit attitudes are thought to measure attitudes 
that are too automatic for motivations to intervene. Contrary to this hypothesis, participants 
in the current study were high in motivations to control prejudice, yet still showed strong 
explicit biases. Why might participants, who were relatively high in motivations to control 
prejudice, feel so uniformly comfortable expressing extreme bias on a direct measure? I 
considered two plausible explanations for this finding.  
First, I was asking participants to make judgments based on minimal information: 
specifically, participants made ratings of photos of individuals and photos of groups and were 
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told that people can be quite accurate at making judgments about others based on small 
amounts of information (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993; Rule & Ambady, 2010; Freeman, 
Johnson, Ambady, & Rule, 2010). Therefore, I may have been inadvertently encouraging 
participants to consider their gut reactions to be valid. Thus, on the direct measure, a photo of 
a Black group may have appeared on the screen asking for a judgment of how aggressive the 
group appeared. Participants may have felt an automatic negative reaction to this photo, and, 
instead of correcting for this quick reaction, they may have felt encouraged to accept their 
primary reaction as valid. Our previous research has indicated that thoughts about one’s 
implicit reactions can impact their correlation with explicit reports (Payne, Cooley, & Lei, 
2010).  
This explanation, however, does not account for the finding that participants seemed 
to feel particularly comfortable rating Black groups as aggressive and non- trustworthy, 
above and beyond bias expressed toward Black individuals.  The difference between bias 
expressed toward White and Black groups was significantly greater than the difference 
between bias expressed toward White and Black individuals. Therefore, I suspect that while 
accepting one’s gut reaction as valid may account for some of the comfort in expressing bias 
directly, that it does not fully account for the explicit findings.  
Secondly, research has shown that certain forms of racism function by heightening 
sensitivity to “nonracial factors that can justify, rationalize, or legitimize behavior that more 
generally disadvantages Blacks relative to Whites” (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2003). The Justification-Suppression model of the expression of prejudice 
provides a framework that would explain my counterintuitive results. In their research, 
Crandall and Eshleman (2003) argue that individuals, early in development, are exposed to 
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and absorb prejudice toward racial outgroups. However, they argue, norms of tolerance and 
appropriate expression cause most to suppress these ingrained prejudices. They hypothesize 
that prejudice is only expressed when there is a race-irrelevant justification such as religion, 
political orientation, or situational ambiguity. For example, Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, and 
Mentzer (1979) found that when choosing between two rooms in which to watch a movie, 
one room with a disabled person already occupying it, participants were more likely to avoid 
the disabled person if they could attribute it to wanting to see an alternate movie (i.e. a 
different movie was playing in each theatre). However, if both theatres were playing the 
same movie, participants did not show an avoidance of the handicapped occupant. In other 
words, the preference of one movie over the other, when available, was used as a justification 
for a choice that was clearly based on differential responding to a disabled person.  To extend 
this justification- suppression argument to the present study, it seems plausible that 
participants are using the fact that they are judging a group as a justification for extreme 
judgments of aggression and non-trustworthiness of Blacks viewed as a group. I would 
expect that those participants who are high in other measures of racism would be most likely 
to look for, and use, justifications for suppressing prejudice. In other words, I thought my 
hypothesis may be particularly likely among those with higher racial bias. 
Study 2 aimed to test this hypothesis by looking at expectations about interactions 
between groups as compared to expectations about interactions between individuals, 
independent of race, as a moderator of direct racial bias as expressed through ratings of 
photos of White and Black groups.  
CHAPTER 7 
STUDY 2 
 
In Study 2 I examined whether negative expectations about groups in general function 
as a justification for race-related stereotyping. In line with the Justification- Suppression 
model of the expression of prejudice, Study 2 examined whether race-irrelevant justifications 
for prejudice (in this case, the degree to which participants believe that groups are abrasive), 
moderate overt expressions of negative beliefs about Blacks. Specifically, Study 2 examined 
ratings of the aggressiveness and trustworthiness of photos of groups with the Race (Black or 
White) of the groups as a within subjects variable. I also measured the degree to which 
participants expect groups to be more abrasive than individuals as a continuous moderator of 
the effect of race on judgments of groups. 
Previous research has shown that participants expect hypothetical interactions 
between groups to be more abrasive and less agreeable than hypothetical interactions 
between individuals (Hoyle et al., 1989). This tendency holds even when participants are 
expecting to take part in the interactions themselves (Hoyle et al., 1989). In this study, I 
predicted that negative expectations about groups in general would serve as a justification for 
expressing prejudice and would moderate the degree of bias expressed on subsequent explicit 
ratings of the aggressiveness and trustworthiness of White and Black groups. Specifically, I 
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expected that participants who believe interactions between groups are particularly abrasive 
would be more likely to show race- related stereotyping of Black groups.  
While I did not have a specific hypothesis about individual difference variables that 
may enhance the use of justifications to express prejudice, an open question for exploration 
was whether the use of justifications to directly express racial prejudice may be related to 
other measures of racism. To examine this question, I included a measure of Symbolic 
Racism. Symbolic Racism measures a more subtle form of explicit racism by measuring 
underlying prejudice toward Blacks based on the endorsement of beliefs that Blacks violate 
traditional values. These beliefs are strongly driven by a belief in the obligation of an 
individual to manage and overcome his or her own struggles. Given the relevance of this 
scale, I included Symbolic Racism scores in relevant analyses to explore whether the 
tendency to use negative group expectations as a justification of explicit racial bias varies 
based on levels of underlying racial attitudes. In other words, in addition to looking at 
moderation of explicit race bias by expectations about groups, I also measured Symbolic 
Racism in order to explore individual differences in the use of justifications. It seems 
possible that having justifications available may allow participants to feel comfortable 
expressing their underlying racial attitudes in their ratings of photos of Black and White 
groups. 
To verify that negative group expectations are operating as a justification of explicit 
prejudice, I also included a measure of implicit stereotyping. Under my hypothesis, I would 
expect that negative expectations about groups in general may serve as a justification or 
moderator of an explicit tendency to rate Black groups as more aggressive and less 
trustworthy than White groups; however, I would not expect that justifications would be 
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related to implicit stereotyping. As described above, measures of implicit attitudes function 
by interfering with conscious corrections of automatic attitudes. Therefore, I predicted that 
negative expectations about groups would moderate explicit prejudice but not implicit 
prejudice. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 113 undergraduates (63 % White; 11% African American or Black; 
19% Asian; 4% Hispanic; 1% Native American or Pacific Islander; 2% Other) at the 
University of North Carolina- Chapel Hill participating for partial course credit. Up to five 
participants signed up for 60-minute sessions through an internet website for human research 
participation. Because my interest in the use of justifications for expressing racial prejudice 
may operate differently if a participant is Black, to simplify interpretations I ran all analyses 
on non-Black participants. Analyses were run on the remaining 101 participants (73% 
female; 27% male). 
Procedure 
Upon arriving to the experiment, participants were seated at a computer in individual 
cubicles for privacy. After signing an informed consent, participants completed a series of 
tasks prompted by the computer in front of them. 
First participants read that they would be completing two unrelated tasks on the 
computer. In the first task, participants learned that researchers are interested in their 
expectations about interactions between individuals and their expectations about interactions 
between groups. Participants then reported the degree to which they endorse a series of 
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adjectives in describing interactions between individuals and interactions between groups.  
The same photos of Black and White groups used in Study 1 followed. Specifically, 
participants were told that people can be quite accurate at making judgments about others 
based on small amounts of information; for that reason, participants learned that researchers 
are interested in their ratings of photos of groups who had interacted in an experimental game 
the previous semester. I expected that those who endorsed more adjectives related to 
abrasiveness in respect to interactions between groups as compared to interactions between 
individuals on the general measure of expectations subsequently would feel more justified to 
report Black groups as particularly aggressive and non-trustworthy as compared to White 
groups.  
The second portion of the experiment was described as a concentration task (implicit 
ratings). As in Study 1, I measured implicit attitudes by using an AMP. After completing the 
AMP, participants completed two questionnaires measuring general race attitudes. 
Measure of General Expectations  
The measure of general expectations of interactions between groups as compared to 
interactions between individuals was adapted from Hoyle et al., (1989). In their studies, 
participants were asked to rate 14 adjectives on 1 (almost never applies) to 9 (almost always 
applies) scales to reflect how much they believed each adjective applied to interindividual or 
intergroup interactions. To examine the factor structure of these adjectives, Hoyle and 
colleagues performed an exploratory factor analysis, which was then confirmed on a 
withheld portion of the initial sample in a confirmatory factor analysis. The authors found 
that the adjectives loaded onto two distinct factors: Agreeableness (Helpful, Loyal, 
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Forgiving, Unselfish, Patient, Trustworthy, Cooperative) and Abrasiveness (Proud, 
Competitive, Overconfident, Aggressive, Demanding, Boastful, Domineering).  
 This procedure was adapted from its original pencil and paper format for use as a 
computer-based questionnaire in the present study. Specifically, participants were first told 
that researchers were interested in their expectations of interactions between individuals and 
their expectations of interactions between groups. In the following portion, participants were 
told to report how much they endorsed each adjective as descriptive of interactions between 
individuals on the 1 to 9 scale. Each adjective appeared on the computer screen alone with a 
scale; once participants made their rating for that adjective, the next adjective appeared with 
the same 1 to 9 response scale. Participants then repeated this series of 14 judgments for 
expectations of interactions between groups. 
Explicit evaluations 
The explicit measure of stereotyping replicated the one used in Study 1 with one 
minor exception. Because my interest was to explore my finding that groups of Blacks, as 
compared to individual Blacks, may be particularly vulnerable to stereotypes, I simplified the 
design by eliminating judgments of photos of Black and White individuals. Therefore, 
participants made ratings on a randomized series of the 4 photos of Black groups and the 4 
photos of White groups used in Study 1. In one block of judgments, all 8 photos were rated 
on how aggressive the group in the photo appeared on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) scale. 
In another block, all photos were rated on how trustworthy the group in the photo appeared 
on a 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) scale. Photos appeared in a random order. 
Self-report attitude measures 
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I used the Symbolic Racism Scale as my self-report measure of racial attitudes (SRS; 
Henry & Sears, 2002). As discussed previously, I wanted to explore the possibility that the 
use of justifications may be particularly likely for those who hold negative race related 
beliefs. 
Results 
Scoring of Continuous Moderators 
To understand participants’ general expectations about groups as compared to 
individuals, I first examined whether groups were rated as more abrasive than individuals on 
the measure of general expectations. Replicating previous work using this scale, I found that 
overall, participants expected interactions between groups (M =5.62, SD =1.25) to be more 
abrasive than interactions between individuals (M =5.17, SD = 1.27), F(1,100) = 7.341, p = 
.008, η2= .068. 
Given that abrasiveness has been found to be a unique factor in previous work using 
the scale, I created an individual difference variable of expectations of abrasiveness of 
interactions between groups as compared to expectations of the abrasiveness of interactions 
between individuals. Specifically, I subtracted the average score on the abrasiveness factor 
when rating individuals, from the same score in regard to groups; higher values of this 
moderator indicated that a participant viewed interactions between groups as more abrasive 
than interactions between individuals (M = .444 , SD = 1.65). To create the Symbolic Racism 
variable, I summed scores across the ten items that make up the Symbolic Racism scale (M = 
23, SD = 4.67). 
Main analyses 
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Explicit evaluations of aggressiveness were scored as the proportion of the maximum 
rating of aggressiveness as in Study 1.  To examine explicit racial bias for aggressiveness 
ratings, I performed a 2-way (Race of group: Black or White) repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with general expectations about groups, Symbolic Racism, and their 
interaction entered as continuous covariates. All covariates were standardized before entering 
them into the ANOVA. I found support for my main hypothesis as can be seen in Figure 3. 
Photos of Black groups (M = .49 SD =.18) were rated as more aggressive than photos of 
White groups (M = .34 SD =.18), F(1, 97) = 80.08, p < .001, η2 = .452.  
Having established race related bias in aggressiveness ratings, I examined the 
interaction of this racial bias with the two continuous moderators. The tendency to rate Black 
groups as more aggressive than White groups was not moderated by general expectations 
about groups, F(1, 97) =.769, p =.383. However, the tendency to rate Black groups as more 
aggressive than White groups was moderated by Symbolic Racism as I might expect: those 
who were higher in Symbolic Racism showed more racial bias, F(1, 97) = 4.43, p =.038. 
Finally, the interaction of general group expectations with Symbolic Racism also 
significantly moderated the tendency to rate Black groups as more aggressive than White 
groups: F(1, 97) = 4.8, p = .031.  Simple effects analyses showed that among those high in 
the expectation that groups are abrasive, Symbolic Racism moderated the level of racial bias 
such that those who were high in Symbolic Racism showed significantly more racial bias 
than those who were low in Symbolic Racism, t(4, 93) = 3.20, p = .03. On the other hand, for 
those who were low in the expectation that groups are abrasive, racial bias expressed toward 
Black groups did not differ based on levels of Symbolic Racism, t(4, 93) = 1.026, p = .363  
(see Figure 4). 
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Explicit evaluations of trustworthiness were scored as the proportion of the maximum 
rating of trustworthiness as in Study 1. To examine explicit race bias for trustworthiness 
ratings, I performed a 2-way (Race of group: Black or White) repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with general expectations about groups, Symbolic Racism, and their 
interaction entered as continuous covariates. All covariates were standardized before entering 
them into the ANOVA. Again, I found support for my main hypothesis such that Black 
groups (M = .38, SD = .15) were rated as less trustworthy than White groups (M = .42, SD = 
.13), F(1, 97) = 5.992, p = .016, η2 = .058 (see Figure 5).  
Looking at moderation analyses, the effects of both continuous moderators were 
significant.  Symbolic Racism predicted the tendency to rate Black groups as less trustworthy 
than White groups, F(1, 97) = 13.12, p <.001.  More importantly, the tendency to rate Black 
groups as less trustworthy than White groups was moderated by general expectations about 
groups, F(1, 97) = 5.08, p =.027. There was no three way interaction: F(2, 97) = .335, p = 
.564 (see Table 1). In total, these results indicate that the tendency to rate Black groups as 
less trustworthy than White groups is related to both high Symbolic Racism and the tendency 
to have general expectations that groups are abrasive, but not the interaction of these two 
moderators.  
Additional Analyses 
Although not central to my hypothesis, I ran a series of additional analyses on 
implicit ratings of Black and White groups. Because implicit measures avoid the same 
conscious deliberation available on an explicit measure, I did not expect justifications to 
work in the same way on my measure of implicit attitudes.   
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 Implicit bias was calculated as the proportion of the maximum rating of aggression 
as in Study 1. These analyses of implicit ratings involved eliminating an additional 11 
participants: 9 participants who reported being able to read Chinese (due to the use of 
Chinese symbols on the AMP), and 3 participants who did not follow task directions for the 
implicit measure and pressed the same button for all stimuli. The following analyses were 
run on the remaining 90 participants. 
To examine implicit ratings of aggressiveness, I performed a 2-way (Race of group: 
Black or White) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with general expectations 
about groups, Symbolic Racism, and their interaction entered as continuous covariates. All 
covariates were standardized before entering them into the ANOVA. As with explicit bias, 
on a measure of implicit attitudes, participants showed a tendency to associate “aggressive” 
more often with Black groups (M = .50, SD = .161) than with White groups (M = .44, SD = 
.139), F(1, 86) = 7.315, p = .008, η2 =.078.  
Further supporting my hypothesis that participants were consciously using 
justifications to express explicit bias, moderation analyses that were significant for explicit 
bias were not significant for implicit bias. Implicit bias was not moderated by general 
expectations about groups, F(1, 86) = 1.824, p = .18, nor Symbolic Racism, F(1, 86) = .569, 
p = .453. Additionally, the interaction of group expectations with Symbolic Racism also did 
not reach significance, F(1, 86) = 2.428, p = .123.    
To examine implicit ratings of trustworthiness, I performed a 2-way (Race of group: 
Black or White) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with general expectations 
about groups, Symbolic Racism, and their interaction entered as continuous covariates. All 
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covariates were standardized before entering them into the ANOVA. As with explicit bias, 
on a measure of implicit attitudes, participants showed a tendency to associate “trustworthy” 
more often with White groups (M = .56, SD = .134) than with Black groups (M = .52, SD = 
.167), F(1, 86) = 3.842, p = .053, η2 =.043.  
Further supporting my hypotheses that participants were consciously using 
justifications to express explicit bias, moderation analyses involving general expectations 
about groups that were significant for explicit bias were not significant for implicit bias.  
While implicit race bias was moderated by Symbolic Racism, F(1, 86) = 5.88, p = .017, 
implicit bias was not moderated by general expectations about groups, F(1, 86) = .03, p = 
.864. Additionally, the interaction of general expectations about groups with Symbolic 
Racism did not reach significance, F(1, 86) = 0.67, p = .796.  
Discussion 
Study 2 simplified my Study 1 design to replicate the finding that on an explicit 
measure, Black groups would be rated as more aggressive and less trustworthy than 
comparable White groups. Following my hypotheses, Study 2 results demonstrated that 
participants are willing to express racial bias toward groups on an explicit measure: Black 
groups were rated as more aggressive and less trustworthy than White groups. 
In Study 2, I also explored a potential mechanism behind this explicit racial bias. I 
hypothesized that explicit racial bias expressed toward Black groups may operate through the 
use of justifications for expressing prejudice. In particular, I expected that negative 
expectations about groups in general may moderate racial bias expressed toward Black 
groups. Further I thought it was possible that justifications may be sought out most by those 
who display other forms of subtle racism—specifically as measured by a Symbolic Racism 
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scale. Symbolic Racism measures a more subtle form of racism by measuring underlying 
negative affect toward Blacks based on the endorsement of beliefs that Blacks violate 
traditional values. As predicted, results indicated that general expectations that groups are 
abrasive moderate levels of racial bias expressed toward Black groups on an explicit 
measure. However, there were slightly different patterns of moderation depending on 
whether subjects were rating groups on aggressiveness or trustworthiness.  
In the case of aggression, the tendency to rate Black groups as more aggressive than 
White groups on an explicit measure was moderated by the interaction of Symbolic Racism 
and negative group expectations. Those who were high in the expectation that groups are 
abrasive and high in Symbolic Racism expressed significantly more racial bias than those 
who were high in the expectation that groups are abrasive but low in Symbolic Racism. I 
interpreted these findings as indicating that expectations that groups in general are abrasive 
serves as a justification for people to express their underlying racial attitudes (as measured by 
the Symbolic Racism Scale) on explicit ratings of Black groups. 
In the case of trust, the tendency to rate Black groups as less trustworthy than White 
groups on an explicit measure was moderated by negative expectations about groups and 
Symbolic Racism individually, but not by their interaction. While I thought it was possible 
that high levels of Symbolic Racism may make individuals particularly aware of, and likely 
to use justifications for expressing prejudice, I did not expect the role of Symbolic Racism to 
vary based on type of rating (i.e. aggressiveness or trustworthiness).  
To explain this unexpected difference, it seems possible that the two adjectives I used 
were differentially tied to knowledge of stereotypes of Blacks. While aggressiveness is a 
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well-known stereotype of Blacks, trust is more generally related to outgroups (Devine, 1989; 
Devine and Eliot, 1995). Therefore it may be that aggressiveness ratings are interpreted as a 
more race-relevant judgment than trustworthiness ratings. It follows that ratings of 
aggressiveness may be a more likely candidate to interact with levels of Symbolic Racism 
because aggression is a distinct stereotype of Blacks. In line with this explanation, use of 
negative expectations about groups as a justification for racial bias depended on levels of 
Symbolic Racism for aggressiveness ratings, but not for trustworthiness ratings. 
My findings were further supported by examining parallel moderation analyses of 
implicit racial bias. I found that while Black groups were more associated with the term 
“aggressive” and less associated with the term “trustworthy” as compared to White groups on 
a measure of implicit attitudes, negative expectations about groups did not moderate implicit 
racial bias. I did not expect the use of justifications to operate on implicit attitudes, as 
measures of these attitudes capture reactions that take place before conscious deliberation can 
occur. 
CHAPTER 8 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The present two studies expand upon knowledge of intergroup conflict and race 
stereotyping by examining perceptions of Blacks who are viewed as a group. In Study 1 I 
found that for both implicit and explicit ratings, Black groups were rated as more aggressive 
and less trustworthy than Black individuals. Importantly, this tendency was significantly 
larger than a similar tendency to rate White groups as more aggressive and less trustworthy 
than White individuals. While I expected racial bias on a measure of implicit attitudes, I were 
surprised to see equally strong levels of racial bias on a measure of explicit attitudes in a 
college population that tends to be motivated to control prejudice.  
Study 2 explored the mechanisms behind my Study 1 findings of strong explicit bias 
toward Black groups. I first simplified my design by looking only at explicit perceptions of 
Black and White groups. Again indicating explicit racial bias, I found that Black groups were 
rated as more aggressive and less trustworthy than White groups. Further I discovered that 
negative expectations about groups in general played a strong role in the expression of racial 
bias. For aggressiveness ratings, negative expectations about groups in general moderated the 
degree to which participants expressed their racial attitudes (as indicated by Symbolic 
Racism scores) in their ratings of photos of Black and White groups. In particular, those who 
were high in the expectation that groups in general are abrasive and also high in Symbolic 
40 
 
Racism expressed the most racial bias in aggressiveness judgments. For trustworthiness 
ratings, those who were high in the expectation that groups are abrasive showed the most 
racial bias, regardless of levels of Symbolic Racism. I interpreted these findings as indicating 
that negative expectations about groups in general may serve as one justification people use 
to express particularly negative judgments of Blacks viewed as a group.  
Theoretical Contribution 
Our findings both contribute to existing theories about interactions between groups as 
well as build upon theories of how racial bias toward Blacks is expressed. First, replicating 
prior work of Hoyle et al. (1989), I found that people hold negative general expectations 
about interactions between groups. Specifically, with no other information about the groups 
or individuals available, purely imagining interactions between groups and then purely 
imagining interactions between individuals leads to differential perceptions: hypothetical 
interactions between groups are more strongly associated with negative adjectives such as 
“hostile” and “domineering” as compared to hypothetical interactions between individuals. 
Other research shows that these negative expectations about groups seem to be based on true 
differences in how groups behave. In the Robbers Cave studies, for example, Sherif and 
colleagues (1961) show that dividing otherwise similar boys into groups at a summer camp 
created surprising levels of aggression and even violence between the two groups in 
subsequent camp games. Extending these findings to the lab, work on the interindividual 
intergroup discontinuity shows consistently that groups behave more competitively than 
individuals (Insko et al., 1994). These findings have been extended to actual aggression 
within the lab (Meier & Hinsz, 2003) and have been found cross culturally (Takemura & 
Yuki, 2002). Therefore the present replication of the finding that people expect groups to be 
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more abrasive than individuals becomes more understandable when one considers that these 
perceptions may sometimes be quite accurate: groups do behave differently than individuals. 
Given my interpretation that these negative expectations about groups serve as a 
justification for expressing explicit racial bias toward Black groups, the current findings also 
extend the Justification- Suppression theory of prejudice. As Crandall & Eshleman (2003) 
proposed, people seem willing to express their race related beliefs as long as race irrelevant 
justifications (in this case, negative expectations about groups in general) are available. In the 
present study, group membership was experimentally combined with race to explore how 
Black groups are perceived. While Black individuals may elicit negative judgments when 
certain justifications are available, Black groups seem to elicit a distinct use of justifications. 
In fact, the present studies show that the mere fact that multiple Blacks are viewed together 
allows participants who are otherwise motivated to control prejudice to feel justified in 
expressing negative beliefs based on race. In other words, it seems possible that some 
participants are rating Black groups as particularly aggressive and non-trustworthy while 
maintaining that these ratings are unrelated to skin color; instead they may contend that their 
negative ratings stem from their belief that groups are generally up to no good.  
 Given that humans are a group dwelling species and that people seek out others who 
are similar to themselves, the fact that Blacks appearing as a group are particularly 
vulnerable to explicit racial bias is problematic. One way to tackle this racial bias may be to 
encourage recategorization of Black groups into a superordinate group which is independent 
of race and which includes the participant as a group member. Previous research on the 
Common Ingroup Identity Model shows that categorizing outgroups into higher order groups 
to which the participant belongs, reduces bias expressed toward former outgroup members 
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(Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman & Rust, 1993; Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzoc & 
Matoka, 1997). For example, in the context of the present study, encouraging participants to 
think of the groups of Blacks as part of the more inclusive group of University of Chapel Hill 
undergraduates would allow White participants to have a common ingroup identity with the 
Black groups in the photos (i.e. school affiliation). Because negative expectations about 
groups probably only applies to outgroups, a common ingroup identity may decrease the 
availability of this justification for expressing explicit racial bias toward Black groups. 
 A different approach to eliminating the negative explicit bias expressed toward Black 
groups may stem from research on the Cross Race Effect. The Cross Race Effect refers to a 
well-established perceptual bias in which those who are of another race appear more similar 
to one another than do members of our own race: in other words this effect refers to the idea 
that we more easily individuate ingroup members than outgroup members (Chance & 
Goldstein, 1996; Meissner & Brigham, 2001). As an example, these studies indicate that a 
White individual will tend to have a harder time recognizing individuating features of a 
Black individual than of another White individual. Research also indicates that the more 
similar members of a group seem, the more “group-like” they are perceived to be (Crawford, 
Sherman & Hamilton, 2002). Combining this with the Cross Race Effect, it seems possible 
that Black groups may seem more “group-like” than White groups (assuming perceivers are 
White) due to a greater difficulty in individuating racial outgroups. Therefore, a second 
potential strategy to reduce the expression of racial bias toward Black groups could be the 
use of individuation, or the focus on the individual rather than the group. In line with this 
idea, research on the Cross Race Effect has shown that individuation training (i.e. training 
skills that help individuate cross race others) minimizes difficulty in individuating outgroup 
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members (McGugin, Tanaka, Lebrecht, Tarr, & Gauthier, 2011; Hugenberg, Miller, & 
Claypool 2007). Therefore, training participants to distinguish among others of another race 
and emphasizing a focus on one individual in the group rather than the whole group, may 
help to eliminate the salience of group membership and prevent its use as a justification for 
expressing explicit racial bias. 
Measurement Implications 
On a measurement level, these findings also raise interesting questions about the type 
of stimuli that should be used in experiments to best capture racial attitudes. Because explicit 
racial bias expressed toward groups correlated quite strongly with Symbolic Racism (more 
strongly, although not significantly, than racial bias expressed toward individuals), it seems 
possible that explicit bias toward Black groups rather than explicit bias toward Black 
individuals, may be a better proxy of individuals’ race attitudes. In other words, because 
scales that measure explicit prejudice such as Symbolic Racism and motivations to control 
prejudice generally ask for attitudes toward “Blacks” as a group, ratings of Black groups may 
be a more accurate way of measuring race stereotyping. Future studies could more formally 
investigate whether explicit ratings of Black groups show greater convergent validity with 
explicit measures of prejudice than do explicit ratings of Black individuals. This could have 
implications for how racial bias is measured in the lab in the future. 
Practical Implications 
On a more practical level, the present findings have implications for inter-race 
conflict in general. When race conflict arises, Blacks are often viewed as a group--united by 
skin color, beliefs, friendships, and motive. Given the present finding that racial bias is 
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exacerbated when applied toward Black groups, we can begin to imagine a pernicious cycle 
of conflict escalation between groups of different races. Some evidence for this potential 
pattern of conflict escalation comes from work on the interindividual intergroup 
discontinuity. These studies have shown that groups behave more competitively and less 
cooperatively than individuals. Additionally, this competitive behavior between interacting 
groups has been found to be mediated by a lack of trust for groups (Cohen et al., 2010). 
Mixing these findings with my current findings, if a White group had the expectation that 
actions undertaken by a Black group would be particularly aggressive and non-trustworthy 
this could lead White group members to behave in a way that elicits more negative behavior 
from Black groups. Therefore, interactions with groups of Blacks may more easily fall into a 
pattern of increasing anger and lack of trust based on racially biased expectations. Future 
studies could examine patterns of behavior within actual interactions between groups of 
different races. 
A related question is whether groups that differ based on affiliation with different 
nations will exhibit particularly lethal levels of conflict when these two nations are 
predominantly different races. This line of thought stems from the idea that nations are 
inherently conceptualized as groups and frequently differ in skin color. For example, do the 
present findings imply that a conflict between England and America (both predominantly 
light-skinned) would be less violent than a conflict between Africa and America 
(predominantly dark-skinned and predominantly light-skinned, respectively)? In reaction to 
the present findings, it seems possible that nations may encounter more intense conflict from 
others who do not share their racial identity than from others who do share their racial 
identity-- holding constant for ideological differences. Future directions could examine this 
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potential by looking at records of international conflict and examining if wars have more 
violent outcomes when the combating nations are of different races. 
Overall, the present studies help to clarify how Blacks are perceived. These findings 
indicate the need to explore both theoretical and practical applications. Theoretically, it is 
important to understand how using groups as compared to individual stimuli changes the 
meaning of ratings as well as their relation with general measures of racial attitudes such as 
Symbolic Racism. Practically, the current findings help to clarify how negative, explicit 
perceptions of Black groups may contribute to intense intergroup conflict between different 
races. Hopefully we can use this information to create more effective interventions for 
reducing conflict between groups of different races. 
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Table 1. Moderation of Explicit Racial Bias for Trustworthiness Judgments by Group 
Expectations and Symbolic Racism, Study 2 
Race Bias (Z) for Trustworthiness Ratings 
 
Predictor 
 
B 
 
SE 
 
T 
 
p-value 
Constant .011   .094 .115 .909 
Group 
Expectations (GE) 
.212 .093 2.281 .025 
Symbolic Racism 
(SR) 
.339 .094 3.591 .001 
GE X SR -.053 .091 -.579 .564 
Note: B’s are unstandardized regression coefficients. All variables were standardized before 
being entered into the regression. 
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Figure 1. Rated aggressiveness of groups and individuals of different races. 
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Figure 2. Rated trustworthiness of groups and individuals of different races. 
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Figure 3. Rated aggressiveness of Black and White groups. 
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Figure 4. Moderation of aggressiveness ratings by Symbolic Racism and general expectations 
about groups. 
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Figure 5. Rated trustworthiness of Black and White groups. 
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